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 Chapter 12
The International Law of the Sea in a
Globalized World
Daniel Moran
Sensible people have long recognized the incongruity of the claim that Christopher
Columbus discovered America, already home to perhaps a million souls at the time
of his arrival. It is less widely recalled that Columbus did not mean to discover
anything. He thought he knew where he was going and, famously, did not quite
realize he had not gotten there. His motives, and those of his royal patrons, were
more commercial than scientific. Columbus set out not to uncover new lands but to
demonstrate the feasibility of transoceanic travel. It was this achievement, and not
his accidental encounter with an unsuspected continent, that proved
transformative. Three centuries later, Adam Smith, the evangelist of modern
capitalism, would declare the voyages of Columbus and his successors to be the
greatest events in the history of the world, a sentiment that has resonated among
recent students of what is now called globalization.1 Although it is not a point of
view to be accepted uncritically, the fact remains that the inhabitants of the
Americas were descended from Asian migrants who arrived on foot via a since-
vanished land bridge across the Bering Strait. When Columbus sailed, neither they
nor any other major human population had reached its present position on the
globe by transiting the high seas.2 Afterward, this would begin to change.
The Age of Discovery and Maritime Order
Columbus’s success presented his contemporaries with two sets of problems, the
first scientific, technical, and organizational; the second legal and political. The
conversion of the world’s oceans from an impassable barrier into what Alfred
Thayer Mahan would call a “great common” required centuries of effort in the
development of ships capable of withstanding the rigors of ocean voyages, new
means of accurate navigation on the open seas (a puzzle that had only just been
solved when Smith wrote), and a shore-based infrastructure capable of sustaining
the new merchant fleets and the navies that protected them. Most histories of sea
power take these achievements as their central theme.
Our interest, however, lies with the second set of problems, those having to do
with the development of legal and political norms governing the use of sea and
with their role in shaping globalization, an expression that requires some
preliminary comment, since its meaning is dependent upon context. A recent
collection of essays on the subject distinguished between economic, social,
cultural, environmental, and military globalization, while noting that additional
categories—political, scientific, linguistic, and so on—were possible.3 Among
economists, the group that has subjected the concept to the most rigorous scrutiny,
the term refers to the tendency of prices and other measures of economic activity
to converge around global norms.4 Others employ it more generally to refer to the
increasing speed and efficiency with which information, material goods, and
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money move about the planet, a process driven mainly by new technologies.5
For our purposes, however, the essential thing is to note that, as presently
understood, globalization in all its forms refers to processes that increasingly
operate independently not just of physical distance but also of nationality and the
power of the state. It is this aspect that defines its relationship to international law
and to our particular concern, which is the law of the sea.
That relationship is less harmonious than might be imagined, though there is a case
to be made for what might be called mutual enablement—that is, that international
legal rules are conducive to the globalization of trade and social intercourse, and
vice versa. As abstract propositions, both international law (a body of theory and
doctrine) and globalization (a social and technological practice) share a common
impulse toward moderating, if not suborning, the authority of state governments.
International law introduces order and due process into the metaphoric space that
separates sovereign polities, a space that would seem to be a natural zone of
expansion for globalizing economic, social, and cultural forces. Conversely, much
of the political resistance to globalization is tinged with concern about its legal
consequences: that it will create too much new international law, thus undermining
the sovereignty of national governments; or that it will not create enough, and so
expose the citizen to the unchecked influence of supranational institutions like the
World Bank, the World Trade Organization, or the International Monetary Fund.
Without commenting on the merits of these concerns, it must be emphasized that
they rest to some extent upon a misapprehension of what international law is. It is
not global law, which is to say it is not the legal expression, even in theory, of the
interests of a global civil society.6 Should such a law become necessary in the
future as a consequence of the changes globalization brings, it would require a
wholesale reconstitution of the international legal system, which is an expression
and creature of the sovereign states that are its subjects. International law, whether
operating within the quasi-anarchical states system that prevailed before World
War I or within confederated structures like the League of Nations or the United
Nations (UN), exists to legitimize certain forms of state power—above all those
concerned with self-defense—and to define and coordinate reciprocal relationships
among sovereignties, whose autonomy, authority, and equality are taken for
granted.
One consequence of the early voyages of discovery was that they provided a sharp
impetus for reflection upon these matters. The commercial possibilities of trans-
oceanic trade were apparent even before Columbus made his voyage. To realize
those possibilities, however, it was equally obvious that the high seas, once their
navigability had been proven, could not simply be left as a zone of lawlessness,
where each could prey without scruple upon all. At first, the effort to impose a
maritime order took the form of schemes to extend the sovereign jurisdictions of
the main maritime powers, a natural impulse given the decentralized and
competitive nature of the European states’ system, but by no means a universal
one. The Chinese, who had sent fleets of treasure junks as far as the east coast of
Africa before Columbus was born, made no attempt to devise a legal regime for
the waters they traversed or the new lands they saw and ultimately abandoned
their voyages of exploration on the grounds that the novelties they disclosed were
of little practical use.
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Among Europeans, however, the proposition that a coastal community had the
right to control the water adjacent to it had been proverbial since ancient times and
was now extended literally to the ends of the earth. In 1494, Spain and Portugal,
with the encouragement of the Pope, divided the world’s oceans between them
along a line in the mid-Atlantic. Other maritime powers followed suit. For most of
the 17th century, what would today be called the territorial sea of the British Isles
was held by the English crown to extend to the shores of Scandinavia, thus fully
encompassing the putative national waters of the Danes. Genoa, Tuscany, the
Ottoman Empire, the Venetian Republic, and the Papacy itself all advanced
similarly extensive claims. Even on the most optimistic interpretation, there was
reason to believe that when the principle of sovereignty was extended to the high
seas, it ceased to be an antidote to anarchy and became an expression of it.
This was so because the pretensions of European princes to rule the oceans were
entirely fanciful. On the high seas, the space between sovereignties, which
international law seeks to organize, is not metaphorical. It is real. It is also vast and
inhospitable to extended human habitation. When, in 1702, a Dutch jurist proposed
that the “maritime marches” of a state be limited to waters within the range of
cannon fired from the shore—a distance subsequently reckoned to be 3 miles—he
was merely affirming the common-sense limits of the possible at the time; though,
it would take another century or so before the practice of confining territorial
claims to a narrow coastal belt became widely accepted.7
Credit for developing the theoretical framework for a maritime regime based upon
freedom rather than extended sovereignty belongs to another Dutchman, Hugo
Grotius, the preeminent figure in the history of early modern international law. In
1604, the Dutch East India Company asked Grotius to prepare a brief defending
the actions of a Dutch admiral who had seized a Portuguese merchantman in the
Strait of Malacca. Although Portugal and the Netherlands were at peace when the
seizure occurred, Grotius argued in a work entitled De Jure Praedae (“On the
Law of Prize and Booty”) that the Dutch admiral was justified because of the
impropriety of Portuguese claims to exclusive trading rights in the East Indies. Five
years later, one section of this brief was published as book under the title Mare
Liberum (“The Freedom of the Seas”), in which it was argued that the seas must
be open to all.
Grotius’ originality as a legal theorist lay in his claim that states, like individuals,
were bound by natural law—that is, rules and principles independent of historical
practice and divine revelation (although compatible with the latter) but rooted in
the inherent logic of facts. As far as the ocean was concerned, the essential facts
were its ubiquity, immensity, and fecundity. In contrast to the land, from which
benefit could be derived only by possession, the sea represented an inconsumable,
self-renewing resource, whose political subdivision was contrary to nature. From
this, two principles and a stipulation followed: that the high seas could not be
appropriated by individuals or states; that any use of the sea by one state must
leave it available for use by others; and that both provisions must apply during
peace and war, except for belligerents, whose goods were lawful prize for each
other.8
Law of the Sea and the Law of War
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Although Grotius’ work acquired great prestige among scholars and political
theorists,9 its impact on the maritime law of preindustrial Europe had more to do
with his analysis of belligerent rights than with his broader doctrine of freedom of
the seas. Claims to sovereignty over the high seas faded during the 18th century
less because of the power of ideas than because most of the countries that
advanced them—Portugal, Spain, and the states of the Mediterranean littoral—lost
out in the military and economic competition of the day; while Britain, one of the
winners and an early advocate of closed seas, changed its mind after 1688, when
the House of Orange replaced the Stuarts on the English throne, thus tempering
Britain’s longstanding trade rivalry with the Netherlands.1 0 The retreat of
sovereignty did not, however, entail any alteration in the prevailing economic
attitude known as mercantilism, which regarded commerce, piracy, and warfare
as, if not synonymous, then as points on a single continuum of international rivalry;
and which measured economic success in terms of the accumulation of assets by
the state, rather than by growth in trade volume, productivity, and so on.
In such circumstances, maritime law could amount to little more than a codicil of
the law of war, by which the taking of prize and booty was organized to general
advantage. This is not to suggest that the law of the sea was of no account in the
Age of Sail. On the contrary: Clausewitz’s peremptory dismissal of international
law as a restraint upon the conduct of war,11 which must have struck the soldiers of
his day as mere common sense, would have seemed absurd to the sailors, whose
professional lives proceeded among a dense web of prize courts, Orders in Council,
Navigation Acts, letters of marque, and a host of treaties and licenses by which the
rights to trade and plunder were parceled out.
Grotius and his successors contributed to the construction and management of this
web by injecting it with theoretical integrity, in the form of what became known as
the Old Rule of prizes. It held, in the words of one authoritative statement, that:
the Goods of an Enemy, on Board the Ship of a Friend, may be taken
that the lawful Goods of a Friend, on board the Ship of an Enemy, ought to be restored
that Contraband Goods, going to the Enemy, tho’ the Property of a Friend, may be taken as
Prize; because supplying the enemy, with what enables him better to carry on the War, is a
departure from Neutrality.12
The Old Rule afforded belligerent warships the right to stop, search, and demand
explanations from any merchant vessel they encountered—a hard system for those
in the carrying trade, who could be hauled before a prize court upon any pretext of
irregularity in their papers or cargo. Yet given the alternative, which was piratical
mayhem, this rough-and-ready practice afforded essential, if modest, protection to
trans-oceanic commerce.
Toward a World Economy
The result was a steady expansion of world trade, which grew by just over 1
percent per annum during the 3 centuries following Columbus’ voyage—in
aggregate a 20-fold expansion, despite the fact that, for most of this period,
warfare was endemic among the major maritime states.13 A similarly dramatic
transformation is apparent in the cultural outlook of European elites. Those who
had access to the goods and knowledge that global commerce brought to Europe
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learned to think of themselves not as members of a world community by any
means, but at least as the preeminent inhabitants of a planet whose farthest reaches
offered scope for their ambitions. Grotius himself regarded the ubiquity of the
oceans as proof that God intended all the nations of the world to be in contact with
each other, so that each might profit from the special talents and resources of the
others.14
Nevertheless, the enthusiasm that some scholars have shown for the proposition
that globalization, as presently experienced, antedates the industrial era is not
supported by a close analysis of how long-distance maritime trade actually worked.
It was, first of all, almost entirely the business of state-chartered monopolies—the
Dutch East India Company is an example—that operated in cooperation with their
respective national navies. The resulting trading patterns did not resemble a
network but were confined to noncompetitive goods of high value relative to their
bulk. Europeans imported spices, tea, coffee, silk, gold, and sugar, which were rare
or nonexistent on the continent, and exported silver, wool, and linen to Asia. Only
goods for which there was no local competition could command prices high
enough to cover the costs of transoceanic transportation. This in turn meant that
while the interruption of overseas trade in wartime might adversely affect the
finances of a state that depended upon it for cash, it had no impact upon the
broader society, which neither produced nor consumed the categories of goods
involved.
True economic globalization, as measured by a combination of trade expansion,
price convergence, and competition between imported and domestic goods, dates
from the dismantling of mercantilism in the decades following the Napoleonic
wars. Two general sets of factors contributed to the demolition. First, and most
important, were improvements in transportation technology. The advent of
railroads lowered the cost of overland transportation—historically an order of
magnitude more expensive than moving the same goods over water—which
expanded the market for products arriving from overseas and also increased the
feasibility of producing low-margin primary commodities for export. The cost
advantages of railroads were compounded by those of oceangoing steamships. The
cost per ton of transoceanic trade did no better than hold its own (and probably
rose) over the 17th and 18th centuries, for reasons that included an increasing need
for insurance and other precautions against capture as prize.15 In the 19th century,
they decline dramatically. No one knows what it would have cost to ship a bushel
of grain from New York to Liverpool in 1800, since it would not have occurred to
anyone to try it. In 1874, however, it cost 20 cents on a piston-engine steamer. In
1881, thanks to the introduction of the Parsons turbine, it cost 2 cents.16
The market efficiencies embodied in new technologies were realized in large part
because of the advance of political liberalism, which shifted state attitudes in the
direction of free enterprise, and because of the prevalence of peace among the
Great Powers following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815.17 Although it would be
wrong to suggest that Europeans had lost their taste for “prize and booty” as a
consequence of the wars engendered by the French Revolution, there is no
question that the Concert of Europe was less prone to adopt war as an all-purpose
instrument of policy than the Old Regime had been. As one recent study of the
period has noted, no European state threatened with war in the decades before
1789 ever succeeded in avoiding it, even if it tried hard to do so.18 This was
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certainly not the case after 1815.
The defeat of France allowed high wartime tariffs to be dispensed with, an
adjustment that marked the beginning of a secular trend toward trade liberalization.
Internal customs duties disappeared in Germany and much of the Habsburg
Empire; the paramilitary royal companies that had dominated global trade under
the Old Regime were disbanded; and Britain, now uncontested master of the high
seas, shifted its weight decisively in favor of free trade by abolishing its tariffs on
imported grain. In the second half of the 19th century, global terms of trade shifted
permanently in favor of finished goods and against primary commodities, whose
prices fall regardless of where they are produced. The rate of trade expansion
between 1820 and 1914 more than tripled compared to that of the previous 3
centuries, to 3.5 per cent per annum, a rate that has persisted to this day.19 Labor
and capital followed the flow of goods. The plummeting cost of transoceanic
transportation allowed tens of millions of Europeans to migrate to the Americas. In
1910, 17 percent of the population of the United States and 24 percent of its work
force consisted of immigrants. By 1913, overseas investment (as a percentage of
total investment) had reached a level comparable to that of today, and possibly
exceeded it.20
Free Trade and Belligerent Rights
The rise of free trade demanded a new approach to the international law of the sea,
in which the theoretical structure developed during the Enlightenment would be
adapted to an environment in which private interests and the rights of neutrals
counted for far more than they had in the past. And here one could do worse than
to recall Clausewitz’s “paradoxical Trinity,” by which war was imagined to be a
phenomenon suspended among three magnets: violence, chance, and reason.21 In
considering the evolution of the law of the sea, one might think of the magnets as
three sets of interests, each in need of legal protection. The first are the interests of
warfare; the second, those of trade, which requires unfettered use of the high seas
and uninterrupted access to the ports of trading partners; the third, those of direct
economic exploitation, which seeks to harvest resources for use and to bar
competitors from doing the same.
The customary prize law of the Old Regime was transformed into the modern,
treaty-based law of the sea because of the increasing strength of the second
magnet during the 19th century. The elemental tug of commerce was strengthened
by the emergence, for the first time, of a major trading state indifferent to the
rivalries of the European powers and without a strong navy of its own. This was, of
course, the United States, whose economic might was arrayed behind a policy that
sought to extend the protection of international law to all private property on the
high seas.
Like most strongly held principles, this one was capable of forcing some
unattractive tradeoffs. Thus the United States, having outlawed the slave trade in
1808 (a year after the British did so), nevertheless refused to cooperate in its
suppression on the high seas, on the grounds that the only thing worse than slavery,
in the words of Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, would be “admitting the
right of search...for that would be making slaves of ourselves.”22 America’s
adamant stance weighed heavily with its biggest trading partner, Great Britain.
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Britain had gotten itself into war with its former colonies in 1812 because of the
Royal Navy’s too-forcible assertion of belligerent rights. When the Crimean War
began in 1854, it sought to avoid any repetition by announcing that it would forego
its right to search neutral vessels engaged in trade with the enemy. This
concession, initially conceived as a wartime expedient, became impossible to
withdraw once granted and was incorporated in a declaration accompanying the
Treaty of Paris in 1856. Under its terms, the Old Rule was supplanted by the New,
whose provisions were that privateering—the licensing of private ships as
commerce raiders—was abolished; that enemy goods (save contraband) could
move freely on neutral ships; that neutral goods (again save contraband) could
move freely on enemy ships; and that a blockade had to be “effective” to convey
belligerent rights—meaning it had to be maintained by large naval forces and not
simply proclaimed as a pro forma means to legalize prize-taking.23
Only seven countries signed the Declaration of Paris, but all the major maritime
powers adhered to it, including the United States, which declined to sign because
the declaration’s provisions fell short of complete immunity for all private vessels,
including those of belligerents. The declaration codified a fundamental change in
the balance of interests between warfare and trade on the high seas, in effect
shifting the benefit of the doubt from the one to the other. It did so, however, at a
time when the globalization of world commerce was altering the strategic
landscape in ways whose implications were decidedly puzzling, at least for those
who favored the advance of liberty in politics.
It was not simply that the cause of freedom on the oceans might confound the
same cause elsewhere, as Adams’s painful remark about slavery makes plain
enough. It was that it was not easy to agree on what kind of legal regime would be
most conducive to the cause of peace, upon which the progress of global trade
depended. The triumph of the New Rule reflected the rise of commercial interests
and a specific interpretation of how those interests would play out militarily.
Advocates of immunity believed they were creating “a partial commercial peace in
the midst of...political war.”24 If war persisted, then at least it would be reduced to
“a duel between Governments and their professional fighters.”25Precisely for that
reason, however, others were convinced that the restraining effects of globalization
on the bellicosity of governments would be lost if commercial interests were not at
risk. In their eyes, the true hope of peace, and the only true security for commerce
in wartime, lay in the continued assertion of belligerent rights by peaceloving
commercial democracies.26
Diplomatically, immunity was a legal position endorsed by states without strong
navies, a fact that advocates sought to finesse by arguing that, like other advances
of free trade, its benefits would accrue to maritime nations—quoting Adams
again—“in proportion to their interests...upon the Ocean.” Strong maritime states
need not fear the loss of belligerent rights, since they were gaining “entire
security” for their own commerce, the true source of national strength in modern
times.27 As the naval strength of the United States grew, however, its experts came
to doubt the wisdom of its traditional policy. Thus Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote to
President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904, warning that America’s insistence upon
“free ships, free goods” had “lost the fitness it possibly once had to national
conditions.” Roosevelt saw the point, while noting that the advance of civilization
had brought with it “a strong tendency to protect private property and private life
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on sea and land.”28 In the event, it proved difficult to abandon an ideological
commitment of such long standing. The United States voted with Germany and a
host of small neutrals at The Hague in 1907, in an unsuccessful attempt to abolish
the right of search and capture on the high seas. It was still hectoring Great Britain
about freedom of the seas until a few weeks before it entered the war against
Germany in 1917.
Globalization in Retreat
By then, however, the real strategic significance of globalization was becoming
apparent, particularly for the inhabitants of continental states cut off by the
competing blockades mounted by Germany and Great Britain. Not only had the
expanding web of commercial relationships created during the 19th century failed
to avert war among trading partners, it also had created new forms of strategic
vulnerability. One reason the British had gone as far as they had in accepting the
New Rule was that they had come to regard war against commerce as an
unprofitable diversion of naval forces—a point of view shared by American
navalists like Mahan. The revolution in the terms of trade that globalization had
brought about falsified this tactical assumption no less thoroughly that it had
dashed liberal hopes for perpetual peace.
All major belligerents in World War I (except the United States) were dependent
upon primary commodities imported from overseas—most critically food, for
which demand is constant and substitution difficult. In 1917, Germans were
consuming 40 percent fewer calories per day than they had been 3 years before,
thanks to the British blockade. The unlimited submarine campaign they unleashed
by way of reprisal brought Britain to the brink of defeat in its turn, an outcome
narrowly avoided only when major naval assets were grudgingly diverted from
fleet operations to commerce protection.
Such effects were unknown to maritime warfare in the past. Under the Old
Regime, the major impact of a naval blockade was financial. In a globally
interdependent world, it struck directly at society as a whole. Prolonged
deprivation of a kind never before experienced by an industrial population eroded
German civilian and military morale and confronted the government in Berlin with
almost insoluble problems of manpower allocation, as the army and war industries
relentlessly absorbed the labor needed to increase domestic food production. Nor
were the effects purely psychological. Upward of 700,000 German civilians died in
World War I, a toll directly attributable to their being cut off from the vast, unseen
network of overseas farmers and grain merchants on which they had become
dependent. In searching for the roots of Germany’s defeat in 1918, the advent of
free trade in grain 80 years before is not a bad place to start.29
World War I brought an end the world’s first great era of globalization. The
subsequent retreat into autarky, which persisted until after 1945, was due partly to
the economic dislocation the war caused and partly to new apprehensions about
excessive dependence on overseas trade.30 Although the creation of the League of
Nations in 1919 promised to inject new vitality into international law, the impact of
collective security on the law of the sea was limited. The general drift of legal
development before 1914, as reflected in the Declaration of Paris, The Hague and
Geneva conventions, and countless other agreements, had been to protect the
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rights of private persons and property, soldiers (as individuals), and neutrals from
the consequences of military action. In the era of collective security, the aim was
raised to incorporate a ban upon international violence per se, a goal for which
legal remedies would prove inadequate in the face of determined aggression by
strong states.
Economic globalization resumed in the 1950s, stimulated by a combination of
proactive measures to hasten postwar reconstruction—the Marshall Plan and the
founding of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund most
prominently—and the final breakdown of European empires, which left successor
states more exposed to the risks and rewards of international markets than ever
before. At the same time, certain basic premises of international life had been
permanently altered by protracted global conflict and the advent of collective
security. Even at the turn of the 20th century, the right of developed states to use
force to manage their relations with the less developed world was scarcely
questioned. In the aftermath of the world wars, this would no longer be true.
The United Nations and Law of the Sea
These developments coincided with a renewed concern with the law of the sea,
pulled along now by economic exploitation, the third of the magnets described
earlier. In Grotius’ day, or for that matter in Mahan’s, the direct appropriation of
ocean resources was chiefly the business of fishermen and whalers, whose
disputes, while perennially contentious, are ultimately parochial. As the
industrialized world shifted from coal to oil as its principal source of energy,
however, the attractions of the seabed for the world’s oil industry became intense,
and the stakes involved in regulating economic use of the ocean grew large.
American companies began drilling a few thousand yards offshore in the Gulf of
Mexico in the 1930s, and as technology improved, the question of how to manage
expansion into deeper, international waters arose. In September 1945, the United
States formally asserted its “jurisdiction and control” over its continental shelf out
to a depth of 200 meters, a zone extending far beyond its 3-mile territorial sea.
Because the claim was specifically to seabed resources, however, the waters above
remained “high seas,” through which free passage was guaranteed.31
Over the next few years, dozens of states followed the American example, albeit
with significant variation in legal form, and in some cases with express reservations
about the international status of the superjacent sea. In 1958, the first United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sought to get the cat back
in the bag by, in effect, codifying what must have seemed to the Truman
administration a simple enough distinction: national sovereignty (roughly) for the
seabed, but not for the water above it.32 By then, however, the process of
subdividing and refining jurisdictional claims beyond the territorial sea, for
purposes of regulating mining, drilling, fishing, environmental pollution, and so on,
had acquired a highly contentious life of its own. In the process, the longstanding
but uncodified convention limiting the territorial sea to 3 miles collapsed, under
pressure from post-colonial regimes with scant means of exploiting or defending
maritime rights, and fearful of encroachment by more capable outsiders. Among
the 101 states that joined the UN between 1946 and 1980, only 8 settled for a
3-mile territorial sea—most claimed 12 miles, a few as many as 200—a tide the
UN was unable to stem at a second conference (UNCLOS II) in 1960.
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For the developed world, the expansion of the territorial sea posed a threat to
navigation and overflight, above all as applied to international straits. Special rules
of access to a few critical straits have been a feature of black-letter international
law since 1841, when the British forced the abrogation of an earlier treaty between
the Russians and the Ottoman Empire, restricting the right to transit the
Dardanelles (which are less than a mile wide at their narrowest point). For most
such vital waterways, however, the 3-mile limit provided de facto assurance of a
middle channel through international water. If 3 miles were stretched to 12,
however, over 100 international straits would become subject to the sovereign
claims of the nations that bordered them. To this concrete concern must be added
nebulous unease about the fact of disorder as such. As Adams pointed out to the
British in the 1820s, powerful maritime states will profit from an orderly oceans
regime in proportion to their interests on the water, even if achieving order means
giving up familiar advantages. The United States would now find itself on the
receiving end of this very argument.
The political leverage by which the major maritime powers would arrest the creep
of sovereignty onto the high seas arose because the prospect of anarchy began to
trouble the developing world as well. In particular, it was feared that new
technologies would allow the mining of polymetallic nodules on and beneath the
ocean floor, an activity in which Third World nations could not compete for lack
of technology and expertise, and which if successful might ruin land-based
producers of the same metals, many of which are found in poor countries.
Extravagant territorial claims projecting outward from the shoreline could not
protect against this threat. In the late 1960s, something between a gold rush and an
arms race seemed to impend, as envisioned most candidly by Malta’s ambassador
to the UN, Arvid Pardo. In an August 1967 speech delivered before the UN Ad
Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor
beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Pardo prophesized that as the seabed
became “progressively and competitively subject to national appropriation and
use,” rapid militarization and resource depletion would follow, through which “the
common heritage of mankind” would be siphoned off “for the national advantage
of technologically developed countries.”33
Pardo’s phrase, “the common heritage of mankind,” would become the watchword
of contemporary ocean law 15 years later, with the promulgation of UNCLOS. The
convention, the fruit of 9 years of negotiation involving 149 countries and
nongovernmental organizations, is in textual terms the longest international
agreement ever recorded. Much of its contents are devoted to technical
questions—the precise methods for drawing the baselines from which territorial
and archipelagic seas are measured, for instance—whose resolutions are mainly of
administrative and juridical significance.34 At the treaty’s heart, however, lay a
pathbreaking political compromise, by which the developed world’s concern with
commercial access and navigation was assuaged in return for concessions designed
to assure poor countries a share in any future development of ocean resources.
And here the treaty’s framers failed to allay the qualms of key constituents,
notably the United States, which balked at the convention’s provisions regarding
seabed mining. Ratification was delayed an additional 12 years while a separate
agreement amending the relevant articles was hammered out. The resulting treaty,
plus the associated agreement, finally entered into force on November 16, 1994,
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and is now regarded by most nations, including the United States, as “an
authoritative expression of existing international law”35 (though it still awaits
ratification by the U.S. Senate).
From the point of view of the continued expansion and integration of the world
economy, the most important achievement of UNCLOS III is undoubtedly its
statutory definition of the territorial sea, which is now limited to 12 miles and
linked to two other legally defined zones, across which a coastal state’s authority
gradually diminishes. Thus an additional 12 miles may be claimed as a contiguous
zone, where a state may enforce its own regulations respecting customs,
immigration, fiscal, and sanitary matters; and beyond that an additional exclusive
economic zone (EEZ), extending out to 200 miles, over which it may claim
exclusive rights with respect to all living and nonliving resources of the water,
seabed, and subsoil. Travel through international straits and archipelagic sea lanes
falling within territorial seas are governed by special rules of transit passage, which
must remained unobstructed at all times for civilian and military vessels alike,
including submerged submarines.
All these provisions have attracted comment and concern. It is by no means
unreasonable to worry, for instance, about states adopting onerous conditions
respecting the treaty’s provision for innocent passage for all ships (including
warships) through territorial seas (as has already happened in a number of
instances 36—though it must be admitted that a propensity for onerous behavior
does not depend on the depth of the water in which it occurs). The enormous size
of the EEZ is sufficient in itself to give pause. Together with the territorial sea and
contiguous zone, it comprises about one-third of the world’s oceans, and 99
percent of the world catch of fish is taken there.37 Its extent ensures that the zones
of neighboring states often overlap, and drawing the lines necessary to separate
them is by no means a purely mechanical process.38 At the same time, because the
EEZ is defined from a baseline drawn along the shore, it does not always
encompass the resource-rich continental shelf, for which many additional rules and
exceptions are provided—rules that have no bearing on the status of the
superjacent waters. From such intricacies, friction will surely come, as well as from
numerous points at which UNCLOS III provisions transgress expectations based
upon earlier treaty law.39
The central issue, however, is whether the hierarchy of zones established by
UNCLOS III checks the drift toward extended sovereignty that began with the
Truman Declaration in 1945 or simply applies an additional layer of grease to an
already slippery slope. History, it has been proposed, shows that “claims to
jurisdiction have always tended to harden into claims to sovereignty,”40 a
proposition that should not be taken at face value. If history shows anything in the
matter, it is that, in international law, practice trumps theory. The question, for
instance, whether the EEZ is high seas, over which coastal states exercise a few
special rights, or alternatively an extension of the territorial sea, in which outsiders
are accorded a few special privileges, is left unsettled by UNCLOS III, and remains
fair game for contestation. Yet it is equally reasonable to view UNCLOS III as
having injected an element of elasticity into a process in which rigidity is usually a
portent of rupture. As long as the major maritime states persist in treating the EEZ
as high seas for purposes of war and trade, that is what it will be. In this regard, the
fact that the largest zones are claimed by states with a profound interest in freedom
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of navigation—the largest EEZ of all is that of the United States—is an additional
source of reassurance.
UNCLOS III initially failed ratification not because of doubts about its regime of
zones, but because of the way it handled what was left over once all the lines were
drawn—specifically the international seabed beneath the high seas, known in the
treaty as “the Area.” It is in the Area that the “common heritage of mankind” is
found, and it was to get a share of it that the developing world was prepared to
curtail its exfoliating claims to sovereignty. UNCLOS III placed the Area under the
jurisdiction of a new agency, the International Seabed Authority (ISA), which was
responsible for regulating exploration and exploitation and for equitable sharing of
benefits. To achieve the latter, it was envisioned that commercial development
would proceed along parallel tracks. Applicants who wished to mine the seabed
would be required to submit plans identifying two sites of equal estimated value,
one of which would be reserved for development by the ISA commercial organ,
called the “Enterprise,” which would distribute proceeds to the treaty’s poor
signatories. Private-sector and national companies that wished to mine in the Area
would be required to sell their technology to the Enterprise and to pay annual fees
for working their designated sites. They would also be subject to ISA-administered
environmental rules and to production limits intended to protect land-based
producers of the same minerals.
These provisions proved troubling to a number of developed countries and wholly
unacceptable to the United States, which became one of only four conference
participants to refuse signature of the treaty in 1982. Much has been written about
the nature of America’s objections and about the cynicism with which they were
advanced, for it was clear to all that the provisions about which the United States
cared most—the new rules defining the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and the
EEZ—were certain to become customary law, regardless of whether the United
States signed or not. Subsequent negotiations amended the deep seabed regime in
fundamental ways by eliminating access fees, mandatory technology transfers, and
production limits; and by changing the ISA composition to ensure that the interests
of developed states were represented in proportion to their economic weight,
rather than their numbers among the UN membership. It was with these
emendations that the treaty finally entered into force.
Beyond UNCLOS
It is difficult today to recapture the intensity of feeling that once attached to
UNCLOS III seabed mining provisions. The celebrated polymetallic nodules have
proven to be among nature’s more elusive creations, whose successful recovery is
now conceded to be many years away.41 In the meantime, the industrialized
world’s anxiety about “strategic metals” has faded with the ending of the Cold
War, while many of the Third World states that hoped to gain from a centralized
scheme for redistributing wealth now prefer market solutions instead. It was,
indeed, precisely because of these exogenous changes in the political and
economic environment that a seabed treaty acceptable to all was finally achieved.
Which, in the present context, is very much the point. During the years in which
UNCLOS III was aborning—roughly the late 1960s to the early 1990s—the world
economy more than doubled in size and developed wholly unanticipated new
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forms of dynamism, integration, and growth—forms in which activities like mining,
however esoteric, play a far less prominent role than anyone imagined a generation
ago. When UNCLOS III was first negotiated, its proponents imagined that it was a
harbinger of the future, “a new platform from which to launch a new international
order.”
The concept [is] of a public international institution that is operational, capable of
generating revenue, imposing international taxation, bringing multinational
companies into a structured relationship; responsible for resource planning on a
global scale, as well as for the protection and conservation of the marine
environment and scientific research. An institution linking politics, economics and
science in new ways—a model, potentially, for international organizations in the
twenty-first century.42
That the past should have been wrong about what the future would hold is
unsurprising. We are undoubtedly equally mistaken in our expectations. The
question UNCLOS III raises is not about failed prophecy but about responsiveness
to the modern pace of social and economic change. And here we must recall a
point made at the start: that international law is made by and for states, which are
not the lead actors in the drama of globalization and may be among the less quick
of the supporting players. UNCLOS III was and is distinguished by a desire to
elevate global interests above those of state governments; quite apart from its
creation of a wholly new international regime for the ocean floor, its signatories
are bound to settle treaty-related disputes either in international courts or through
binding arbitration. Yet the convention’s effort to visualize how those interests
should be embodied in institutions already looked outdated on the day it came into
force.
Law of the Sea versus Global Terrorism: Wrong Place to Look
The terrorist attacks directed against the United States in September 2001 seem
certain to challenge the law’s capacity to adapt to strategic change as well. The
modern law of war aims to discriminate between the civil and the military,
between belligerents and bystanders, between the use of lethal force and the larger
interests of humanity. Its capacity to interpret events and render justice will be
sorely tested by new forms of massive social violence designed precisely to blur all
such distinctions. How far the global war on terrorism will impact the distinctive
interests of the law of the sea is difficult to judge, though it is easy to imagine
scenarios by which that impact could be profound. Had the attacks of September
11 been delivered not by hijacked airliners but by liquefied natural gas tankers
detonated in New York Harbor and the Delaware Bay, the subsequent actions of
the U.S. Navy probably would not have been much constrained by concern for a
12-mile territorial sea. Yet it is generally true that international legal structures fall
short when confronted with worst-case scenarios, and in their absence it is perhaps
equally likely that the habits of compromise and conciliation that UNCLOS III
embodied will prove their worth in strategic terms as well.
Still, the international law of the sea has evolved to support global trade and
enterprise. Its value in the eradication of a global scourge is as yet untested. The
best historical precedent, the suppression of the slave trade, is not reassuring.
Rather like terrorism, slavery in the 19th century was a practice that found few
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open defenders beyond the narrow ranks of those directly involved in it. It was
declared anathema by the Treaty of Paris in 1815 and outlawed everywhere in
Europe, even by states that tacitly supported the overseas trade between Africa
and the Americas. Yet the British, who were determined to end the trade, were
unable to construct an international legal consensus, because action against slavery
was thought to jeopardize other important interests—free trade in the case of the
United States, and national pride and autonomy in the case of small countries such
as Portugal and Belgium, which profited surreptitiously from the trade. In the end,
the British proceeded instead on the basis of bilateral treaties and by asserting
what was in fact a belligerent right—the right of search—in peacetime, a
borderline illegal practice that heightened Britain’s reputation for arrogant
unilateralism.43 Slavery and the trade in slaves were proscribed by international law
only in 1926, long after the issue had been substantially settled by more forcible
means.
It therefore bears repeating: in matters of international law, practice trumps theory.
Or, more precisely, it precedes it, both logically and for the most part historically,
as the developments surveyed in this essay illustrate clearly enough. This
deferýnce of theory to practice is not a defect of international law. On the
contrary, it is testimony to its underlying realism and utility. Yet it does suggest
that international law is probably not the place to look for leadership in solving the
problems of the emergent global economy or in addressing the strategic challenges
that have followed in its wake.
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 Chapter 13
Beyond Integration: Globalization and
Maritime Power from a European
Perspective
James H. Bergeron
It is common in discussions of U.S.–European Union (EU) relations to point out a
supposed difference in strategic viewpoint between the two. The United States is
often depicted (especially in Europe) as being overly committed to a neorealist
vision of international relations—a world of friends and foes, deterrence, power,
and conflict. In turn, European political culture is often described (especially in the
United States) as immature, insular, naïve in its reliance on supposed international
norms, and overly focused on diplomacy, development aid, and crisis management
solutions to international problems. At the heart of these differences (and there are
differences, although they often are distorted out of proportion) lies competing
visions of globalization, based on different (but intertwined) historical experiences.
This chapter explores the European concepts of globalization and examines how
they have changed over time, particularly since September 11, 2001. It will then
consider the implication of the European global perspectives for EU maritime
doctrine and the future of its force structure.
Europe is at a crossroads in its global vision, a situation that has been developing
since the end of the Cold War but has become an imperative issue since September
11 and the potential changes in U.S.–EU relations that may come in its wake.
European states do not view the world similarly, but it has been the case the most
European states have, since 1945, focused their vision on the European integration
project to the exclusion of wider geostrategic concerns. This was partly and
understandably due to the roles played by the United States and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) during those years as the guarantors of Western
defense. In contrast, the 1990s witnessed a slow development of European
strategic consciousness at the level of EU institutions, culminating in the European
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the development (at least on paper) of a
European Rapid Reaction Force. All of this has been accelerated since September
11. The post-September 11 world creates both challenges and opportunities for
Europe different from anything they have had to address for over 30 years, and for
many EU member states, the revival of an old conundrum: the need for Europe to
act as a global, rather than a regional, power.
European Integration as a Surrogate for Globalization
A linkage has always existed between the parallel European projects of integration
and defense. Thus it was at the beginning. It is now mostly forgotten (especially in
Washington) that the United States was among the main promoters of the failed
European Defense Community initiative in the early 1950s. Instead of a separate
European defense alliance, what developed was a selective European Economic
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Community (EEC)—guided by France and West Germany—with security
provided by NATO, whose membership extended beyond the EEC.1 By the 1960s,
Europe was an economic, political, and security part of a grander transatlantic
whole, of variable geometry, and with high tensions. It was the era of the Berlin
airlift, the Cuban missile crisis, and the John F. Kennedy assassination. The Cold
War was truly cold and threatened to become hot.
The period between the failure of the first EEC applications of the United
Kingdom and Ireland in 1962, and the final accession of the United Kingdom,
Ireland, and Denmark to the community in 1973 witnessed a substantial
transformation in the global context of European integration. U.S.-Soviet relations
stabilized. President Richard Nixon initiated a policy of détente with the Soviet
Union and opened a diplomatic door to China. U.S. defense spending fell, the Navy
shrank. The threat, such as it was, existed more in Southeast Asia than in Europe.
Although at the epicenter of nuclear confrontation, the very enormity of such a
confrontation reduced the likelihood, in the eyes of many Europeans, of a nuclear
war ever occurring in Europe. Détente and the advent of arms control agreements
reduced the nuclear specter still further. In Europe, the world of détente had
become a more peaceable one, and it made possible the emergence of a different
kind of EEC.
For just at that time, in the late 1960s, began the construction of a more
autonomous, civilianized European Community (EC) that represented an inward
shift in the global paradigm for many European states. Although the De Gaulle
plan for a European Political and Defense Union had come to naught, his historic
rapproachment with Konrad Adenauer in 1962 had created Franco-Germany as
the center of gravity of a European project that would have a more commercial
and social focus. The expansion of EEC economic and social law, including
especially the free movement of persons, and the expanding constitutional law of
the EEC Treaty emerging from the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg
provided a foundation for a view of Europe as a quasi-federal entity, a
constitutional legal order based on treaty.
This new Europe was one of trade and travel, of increasing labor and capital
mobility, competition law and economic regulation, a bright Europe whose new
optimism (at least within the EC institutions) was unblemished by the defense and
security concerns that were the responsibility of the United States or the member
states acting through NATO. Or perhaps, from an institutional perspective, the new
Europe was a project of national foreign ministries, trade ministries, other
ministries such as labor, environment, and finance, judges, lawyers, corporations,
business and interest groups. Ministries of defense and the military had almost no
role within the scope of the community and so naturally took their lead, and their
focus, from NATO.
In effect, the common market had created a space for positive European
cooperation, outside of the sphere of superpower confrontation (although
supported by the United States for political and economic reasons). It also played
an important psychological function, in making the EC member states masters of
their own destiny, albeit within a narrow confine of interests, in an era of
decolonization, the economic domination of the United States and growing
economic rivalry of Japan, and the arrival from the late 1950s of new immigrant
populations from the former colonies.2 European integration itself thus represented
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a form of globalization, based on the rule of international law, supranational
institutions, harmonization of laws and policies, and the free flow of goods,
persons, capital, culture and ideas. It was a rational or planned globalization,
brought about as an act of the sovereign wills of EC member states pooling their
sovereignty. It was a very “European” globalization based on the assumption of
managing technological forces through cooperation and legal regulation.3
The presence of the United States, in Europe and globally, was of course an
essential precondition for this Brussels worldview. Defense could be ignored
within the corridors of the European institutions precisely because it had been the
first European market to have been integrated, through NATO.4 With defense
sovereignty pooled in NATO under the leadership of the United States—and thus
depoliticized from an internal European perspective—the EEC could develop a
remarkable power-sharing model that gave influence to smaller states and the
European Commission. In particular, the “big four” powers—France, West
Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom—did not exercise the kind four-power
directoire over Europe that might have been the case were political and security
policy issues in play in the Council.
Ironically, the more stable world of détente allowed for the creation of a greater
space for European foreign policy, at least in the sense of formal political
declarations. The early 1970s witnessed the emergence of an informal European
Political Cooperation in the Council of Ministers, European support for the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (against U.S. policy wishes),
and the rebuff of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s “Year of Europe” attempt
to reexert a more robust U.S. foreign policy hegemony. The new emphasis from the
1970s to the 1990s was on the internal market, employment policy, competition,
regulation, state aids, cohesion and development funds, free movement, economic
and monetary union, subsidiarity, European citizenship. External relations were
primarily concerned with economic relations, in particular the General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs, but also trade association agreements, and preferential
agreements for former colonies and developing countries.
Yet it was in these years of European development, the heyday of the EC in the
view of many, that Europe as a set of institutions withdrew further from security
and defense concerns. It is noteworthy that during the Second Cold War following
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and through the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces crisis, the Community developed no significant autonomous
security policy or institutions. NATO, led by the United States, remained firmly at
the helm of European defense policy. This was also the era of declining European
defense expenditures and of a growing gap between European and U.S. military
capabilities, as the United States turned to computer and information technologies
to reinvent the art of post-Vietnam warfare.
The Cold War Ends: First Crack in the Assumed Security
Paradigm of Europe
In 1986, the great European initiative was the completion of the internal
market—the creation of a Europe without frontiers. Three hundred directives were
to be implemented by the member states in areas such as banking and financial
services harmonization, mutual recognition of professional qualifications, technical
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